

NESTORIUS WAS ORTHODOX

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Dedicated to the memory of my mother, Stella Anastos, who
died on January 26, 1962.

Αἰωνία ἡ μνήμη

I. PREFATORY REMARKS ON NESTORIUS AND CYRIL¹

JUST as all thinking people are said to be either Platonists or Aristotelians, most theologians favor either Nestorius or Cyril. Both have their admirers, who usually assume, with championship of one of the two, an intense dislike for the other. Tradition and the Church (except, of course, for the Nestorians) have handed down a judgment adverse to Nestorius. This is unfortunate, not because Nestorius was always right, as he was not, but rather because both he and Cyril, when measured by the standard of the Fourth Oecumenical Council (held at Chalcedon in 451) and its Creed, which is the major criterion of Christological orthodoxy, have similar—or reciprocal defects.

It should be noted carefully that my dogmatic definitions and the case for Nestorius are based upon the Chalcedonian Symbol and Cyril's *Second Letter to Nestorius*. Except for a brief reference (at note 66 *infra*), I do not discuss the question of the relationship between Nestorius' Christology and that of Cyril's *Third Letter* (with its *Twelve Anathemas*), which did not achieve oecu-

¹ I had completed this article before reading Aloys Grillmeier's admirable paper (see *infra*), with which I am in essential agreement. The major difference between us is that I take Nestorius to have been *completely* orthodox, whether judged on the criterion of the Chalcedonian Symbol or from the point of view of speculative theology, whereas he has some reservations. Excellent also is the book (see *infra*) of R. V. Sellers, who argues that Nestorius and Cyril were in reality seeking the same theological goals. His results are very similar to mine except that my method and purpose differ from his.

For the earlier bibliography on Nestorius, see Johannes Quasten, *Patrology*, 3, *The Golden Age of Greek Patristic Literature from the Council of Nicaea to the Council of Chalcedon* (Utrecht-Antwerp-Westminster, 1960), 514–19; Berthold Altaner, *Patrologie*, 5th ed. (Freiburg im Breisgau, 1958), § 72; Eng. transl., Hilda C. Graef (*ibid.*, 1960). See especially Aloys Grillmeier, "Das Scandalum oecumenicum des Nestorius in kirchlich-dogmatischer und theologiegeschichtlicher Sicht," *Scholastik*, 36 (1961), 321–56; Helmut Ristow, "Der Begriff *πρόσωπον* in der Theologie des Nestorius," *Aus der byzantinistischen Arbeit der deutschen demokratischen Republik (Berliner byzantinistische Arbeiten*, 5 [Berlin, 1957]), 218–36, who makes little use of the *Bazaar*; Luigi I. Scipioni, *Ricerche sulla Cristologia del "Libro di Eraclide" di Nestorio* (*Paradosis*, 11 [Freiburg, Switzerland, 1956]), is ecclesiastically committed to the traditional condemnation of N., though his approach to N.'s "metaphysics" is fresh and original; Chrysostomus Baur, "Drei unedierte Festpredigten aus der Zeit der nestorianischen Streitigkeiten," *Traditio*, 9 (1953), 101–26: texts with an "Antiochene" Christology; Thomas Camelot, "De Nestorius à Eutyches," *Das Konzil von Chalkedon*, edd. Aloys Grillmeier and Heinrich Bacht, 1 (Würzburg, 1951), 213–42; Henry Chadwick, "Eucharist and Christology in the Nestorian Controversy," *Journal of Theological Studies*, N.S. 2 (1951), 145–64; Aubrey R. Vine, *An Approach to Christology* (London, 1948); G. L. Prestige, *Fathers and Heretics* (London, 1940), 120–79; R. V. Sellers, *Two Ancient Christologies* (London, 1940); É. Amann, "Nestorius," *Dictionnaire de théologie catholique*, 11, 1 (Paris, 1931), 76–157; Friedrich Loofs, *Nestorius and His Place in the History of Christian Doctrine* (Cambridge, 1914); J. F. Bethune-Baker, *Nestorius and His Teaching* (Cambridge, 1908). On the philosophical implications of "Nestorianism," see Harry A. Wolfson, *The Philosophy of the Church Fathers*, 1 (Cambridge, Mass., 1956), 451–63. See special note at the bottom of p. 140.

The sources on which this paper is based are: Paul Bedjan, ed., *Nestorius, Le Livre d'Héraclide de Damas* (Leipzig-Paris, 1910), a critical edition of the Syriac version, against which I have verified the principal texts quoted *infra*; all of the English translations have been taken verbatim from G. R. Driver and Leonard Hodgson, *Nestorius, the Bazaar of Heracleides, newly translated from the Syriac* (Oxford, 1925). Cf. F. Nau, *Nestorius d'après les sources orientales* (Paris, 1911); Friedrich Loofs, *Nestoriana, Die Fragmente des Nestorius* (Halle a. S., 1905); and the immensely learned, extremely detailed, but massively unusable work of Ignaz Rucker, *Studien zum Concilium Ephesinum, A. Orientierende Quellenkunde; B. Zur Dogmengeschichte nach dem syrischen Liber Heraclidis*, ed. Bedjan, 1910 (1930–35), outlined by the author in B, IV, a, b, c, *Das Dogma von der Persönlichkeit Christi* (Oxenbronn bei Günzburg a. D., 1934), and *idem*, A, III, *Ephesinische Konzilsakten in syrischer Überlieferung* (*ibid.*, 1935).

menical sanction until 553 (see note 8 *infra*), and is therefore irrelevant to the subject of this paper.

Nestorius was condemned at Chalcedon (as also in 431 at Ephesus by the Third Oecumenical Council) for dividing Christ into two separate persons, although he always claimed that he was not guilty of making such a division, and continually affirmed his belief in the oneness of Christ. On the other hand, Cyril, who was enthusiastically acclaimed at both Ephesus and Chalcedon, formulated a Christology which many deem to be in direct conflict with that of 451. He repeatedly declares Christ to have been both divine and human, God and man. But his critics complain that, in his advocacy of the "hypostatic union" and the Apollinarian Christological formula, *μία φύσις τοῦ Θεοῦ Λόγου σεσαρκωμένη* ("one incarnate nature of God the Word"), which he mistakenly took to be Athanasian in origin, he lost sight of Christ's human nature. Curiously, in the appraisal of Nestorius and Cyril, it can be shown that the case for each rests mainly upon his understanding and use of a single word, to which he assigned contradictory meanings. The decisive term for Nestorius was *πρόσωπον* (person), which he used in two different senses; and Cyril² had similar difficulty with *φύσις* (nature).

Both were guilty of flagrant inconsistency. But both obviously meant to be what we call orthodox; and the more this question is studied, the more it appears that the conflict between them was not primarily theological in character, but largely personal, ecclesiastico-political, and terminological. If Nestorius and Cyril could have been compelled to discuss their differences calmly and to define their terms with precision, under the supervision of a strict and impartial arbiter who could have kept them under control until they had explained themselves clearly, there is little doubt that they would have found themselves in substantial agreement theologically, though separated *toto caelo* as far as the prestige of their respective archiepiscopal sees was concerned. Being Archbishop of Constantinople (428-31) and champion of the theological tradition of the city of Antioch, in which he had begun his career, Nestorius resented the intervention of Cyril, the Archbishop of Alexandria (412-44), who had determined to humble the clergy of the capital city and gain dominion over the entire Eastern Church.

In discussing Nestorius, I have for obvious reasons disregarded almost entirely the remarks attributed to him by his opponents, and have relied heavily upon his own book, the so-called *Bazaar of Heracleides*, which he

² For the bibliography on Cyril, see A. Spindeler, "Kyrillos," *Lexikon für Theologie und Kirche*, 6, 2nd ed. by Josef Höfer and Karl Rahner (Freiburg im Br., 1961), 706-9; Quasten, *Patrology*, 3, 116-42; Altaner, *Patrologie*, § 56. In my forthcoming book, *The Mind of Byzantium*, I discuss Cyril's position and the Emperor Justinian I's espousal of the Cyrillian theology in separate chapters. For the Apollinarian origin of Cyril's Christological formula, see Hans Lietzmann, *Apollinaris von Laodicea und seine Schule*, 1 (Tübingen, 1904), 108ff., 133f., 185ff., 251.1 ff.; *Contra fraudes Apollinaristarum*, P.G., 86, 2, 1948-76 (authorship unknown). Cf. Joseph van den Dries, *The Formula of Saint Cyril of Alexandria, mia physis tu Theu Logu sesarkomene* (Rome, 1939). In 532, Hypatius of Ephesus, a strict Chalcedonian, denounced the Apollinarian forgeries. He refused to believe that the highly revered Cyril could ever have been duped by them and preferred to regard the frequent appearance of the Apollinarian formula in Cyril's works as the result of interpolation by heretics: *Acta conciliorum oecumenicorum*, ed. Eduard Schwartz (cited *infra* as *ACO*), 4, 2 (Berlin, 1914), 171.40-173.2, 179.38-180.3; cf. note 8 *infra*.

completed in exile *ca.* 451. Unfortunately, the Greek text of this work has disappeared, but there is a Syriac translation dating from the sixth century which seems to be reliable, notwithstanding an initial error of the translator, who misunderstood the word *πραγματεία* ("treatise") in the original title, and incorrectly rendered it by *Bazaar*. The Heracleides in question was a man of high repute, whose name Nestorius deliberately substituted for his own, as we learn from the preface to the Syriac version, in order to attract readers, since, he feared, the pious would have been repelled by that of a notoriously heretical author.

It may be, as some object, that the *Bazaar* represents a Nestorius who had had twenty years since his condemnation in 431 to repent of his errors and make essential emendations. Even if this be true, it remains legitimate to allow him to be judged by his own latest and most mature efforts.

2. NESTORIUS GETS INTO TROUBLE

Theodore of Mopsuestia,³ the leading theologian of the School of Antioch, vigorously attacked the Apollinarian formula, *one incarnate nature of God the Word*; and his antipathy for this description of the relation of the two natures in Jesus Christ was shared by Nestorius, who had been transferred to Constantinople in 428, the year of Theodore's death. Nestorius first provoked⁴ the ire of conservative theologians when he espoused the view of a Constantinopolitan presbyter by the name of Anastasius that Mary the Virgin should not be described as Θεοτόκος ("she who bore God" or "Mother of God"). It was proper to speak of Mary as Χριστοτόκος ("Mother of Christ"), or, with the appropriate reservations, as Ἀνθρωποτόκος ("Mother of man"), or even possibly as Θεοδόχος ("God-receiving"), Nestorius said, but impious to suggest that a mortal woman could have been the Mother of God.

The designation Theotokos for Mary had been current at least since the beginning of the fourth century,⁵ and meant that Mary, the mother of Jesus

³ On Theodore of Mopsuestia, see the works cited in notes 1 f. *supra*, s.v. In my paper, "The Immutability of Christ, and Justinian's Condemnation of Theodore of Mopsuestia," *Dumbarton Oaks Papers*, 6 (1951), 125–60, I show that Theodore's Christology was heretical because of his misuse of the term *τρεπτός* as defined by the First Council of Nicaea in 325. This seems to me to be a simpler and more decisive solution of the problem of Theodore's Christology than the erudite but complicated analyses to be found in the numerous books and monographs that have been written on this subject. The literature is collected by Luise Abramowski, "Zur Theologie Theodors von Mopsuestia," *Zeitschrift für Kirchengeschichte*, 4.F. 10 = 72 (1961), 263–93; Quasten, Altaner, etc., *op. cit.*, s.v.

⁴ Socrates, *H. E.*, 7, 32, P.G., 67, 808ff.; cf. note 6 *infra*.

⁵ First occurrence, ed. Hans-Georg Opitz, *Athanasius Werke*, 3, 1, 1 (Berlin-Leipzig, 1934), 28.15f. (P. G. 18, 568C): a letter written in 324 by Bishop Alexander of Alexandria to the homonymous bishop of Thessalonike. Socrates, *H. E.*, 7, 32, 17, says that Origen wrote a long dissertation on the suitability of this designation for Mary in his *Commentary on Romans*, but the term cannot be found in the extant text or in the other early authors who are often cited (see works listed *infra*).

On the Virgin Mary, see Georges Jouassard, "Marie à travers la patristique," ed. Hubert du Manoir, *Maria, études sur la sainte Vierge*, 1 (Paris, 1949), 70ff., n.b. 85ff.; Antoine Wenger, "Foi et piété mariales à Byzance," *ibid.*, 5 (1958), 923–81; *idem*, *L'assomption de la T. S. Vierge dans la tradition byzantine du vi^e au x^e siècle* (Paris, 1955); Carlo Cecchelli, *Mater Christi*, 4 vols. (Rome, 1946–54); Mauricius Gordillo, *Mariologia orientalis (Orientalia Christiana Analecta, 141* [Rome, 1954]); Martin Jugie, *L'immaculée conception dans l'Écriture Sainte et dans la tradition orientale* (Rome, 1952); *idem*, *La mort et l'assomption de la Sainte Vierge* (Studi e Testi, 114 [Vatican City, 1944]); V. Schweitzer,

Christ, was in a strict sense the mother of the humanity of Jesus, which had been united in her womb with the divine nature of the eternal Logos. No one ever suggested that Mary was the mother of the divine nature, but only that the divine Logos had joined himself to the human nature of Jesus at the moment of conception, and that, by reason of the closeness of the union between the divine and human natures in Christ (the *communicatio idiomatum*, on which see notes 56–70 *infra*), she might then be called the Mother of God (see note 65 *infra*). For, all agreed, the flesh to which she gave birth was that of the divine Logos, and the Jesus Christ she bore was God as well as man.

Nestorius concedes that the epithet Theotokos was innocuous if properly explained in this fashion.⁶ But, with rare exceptions, he refuses to use it by itself, as Cyril constantly did, without adequate qualification. Even apart from his strictures on this term, however, which was sanctioned by the universal Church at the Fourth Oecumenical Council in 451 (see note 9 *infra*), Nestorius was accused of other theological irregularities, and stands officially condemned as a heretic.

But he still has his champions.⁷ The Christians of Persia, who seceded from the Byzantine imperial Church in 424, before the Nestorian question had arisen, and their descendants, the “Nestorians” of later times, revere his authority. In addition, a host of modern writers have taken up the cudgels in his defence.

“Alter des Titels θεοτόκος,” *Der Katholik*, Ser. 3, 27 (1903), 97–113. Cf. also Georges Jouassard, “Deux chefs de file en théologie mariale dans la seconde moitié du iv^{ème} siècle: saint Epiphane et saint Ambroise,” *Gregorianum*, 42 (1961), 5–36; Daniel Stiennon, “Bulletin de théologie mariale byzantine,” *Revue des études byzantines*, 17 (1959), 201–50; *Lexikon der Marienkunde*, edd. Konrad Algermissen, Ludwig Böer, Georg Engelhardt, Michael Schmaus, Julius Tyciak (Regensburg, 1957–); René Laurentin, *Court traité de théologie mariale*, 4th ed. (Paris, 1959); Sergius S. Fedyniak, *Mariologia apud pp. orientales* (*Basilium M., Gregorium Naz., Gregorium Nys.*) (Rome, 1958).

⁶ My references to the *Bazaar of Heracleides* are to the pages of the translation of Driver and Hodgson. See on this point pp. 99f., 148ff., 185, 193f., 293f., 295ff., 387 (fr. 271); Loofs, *Nestoriana*, index C, s.vv. ἀνθρωποτόκος, χριστοτόκος, Maria (p. 402), θεοδόχος. N. b. 177.11f., 263.12, 276.3–5, 277.20; Nestorius’ *Second homily on the temptations of Jesus*, ed. F. Nau, *op. cit.* (note 1 *supra*), 345.7f., in which he uses θεοτόκος without exegesis; cf. Loofs, *op. cit.*, 191.6, 19f., 272.13–273.1.

⁷ See especially in note 1 *supra*: Grillmeier, Vine, Sellers, Loofs, Bethune-Baker, *op. cit.* Of these, Sellers is the most favorable to Nestorius. On the Persian Council of 424, see J. B. Chabot, *Synodicon orientale ou recueil de synodes nestoriens* (*Notices et extraits des manuscrits de la Bibliothèque Nationale et autres bibliothèques*, 37 [Paris, 1902]), 43–53, 285–98. Cf. Ignacio Ortiz de Urbina, “Storia e cause dello scisma della Chiesa di Persia,” *Orientalia Christiana Periodica*, 3 (1937), 456–85; J. Labourt, *Le christianisme dans l’empire perse sous la dynastie sassanide*, 224–632 (Paris, 1904), 121–25.

On the Nestorians, see J. Joseph, *The Nestorians and their Muslim Neighbors* (Princeton, 1961) (modern only); Bertold Spuler, “Die nestorianische Kirche,” *Handbuch der Orientalistik*, 1. Abt., Bd. 8, Abschn. 2 (Leiden, 1961), 120–69; Raymond Janin, *Les églises orientales et les rites orientaux*, 4th ed. (Paris, 1955), 409–29; Wilhelm de Vries, *Der Kirchenbegriff der von Rom getrennten Syrer* (*Orientalia Christiana Analecta*, 145 [Rome, 1955]); *idem*, *Sakramententheologie bei den Nestorianern* (*Orientalia Christiana Analecta*, 133 [Rome, 1947]); A. C. Moule, *Nestorians in China* (London, 1940); Aubrey R. Vine, *The Nestorian Churches, a Concise History of Nestorian Christianity from the Persian Schism to the Modern Assyrians* (London, 1937): a popular survey; Martin Jugie, *Theologia dogmatica christianorum orientalium ab ecclesia catholica dissidentium*, 5 (Paris, 1935), 9–347; E. Tisserant, “L’église nestorienne,” *Dictionnaire de théologie catholique*, 11, 1 (Paris, 1931), 157–323; Konrad Lübeck, *Die altpersische Missionskirche* (*Abhandlungen aus Missionskunde und Missionsgeschichte*, 15 [Aachen, 1919]): has references to sources. Cf. also Juan Mateos, *Lelya-Sapra, essai d’interprétation des matines chaldéennes* (*Orientalia Christiana Analecta*, 156 [Rome, 1959]); Henri Bernard, *La découverte de nestoriens mongols aux Ordos et l’histoire ancienne du Christianisme en Extrême-Orient* (Tientsin, 1935); George P. Badger, *The Nestorians and Their Rituals*, 2 vols. (London, 1852): erudite travelogue with translations from the liturgy.

Some argue that the action of the Council of Ephesus in 431 was ambiguous and cannot be regarded as a valid oecumenical condemnation of Nestorius. They point out, also, that the Letter of Cyril (the Third) most damaging to Nestorius, was not approved by the Church until 553.⁸ Others contend, in a variety of ways, that Nestorius has been misrepresented or misunderstood and never was guilty of the dogmatic lapses that have been attributed to him.

But in general not even the most favorably disposed among his defenders have said much more in his behalf than that he was almost or nearly orthodox. In dogmatic theology, however, such an apologia is meaningless, and is very much like saying of an egg that "it is partly fresh" or that "parts of it are excellent." A doctrine is either heretical or it is not, and only a slight defect, no larger than the letter iota, which was all that separated the orthodox from the heretics in the matter of ὁμοούσιος, is sufficient to invalidate an entire system.

My own thesis is that Nestorius was not only thoroughly and indubitably orthodox, but also in many respects the profoundest and most brilliant theologian of the fifth century. It must be admitted that his style is often turgid and confusing. The repetitiousness of his great theological treatise, the *Bazaar of Heracleides*, is frustrating, wearisome, and painful. It would have been vastly more effective if some expert rhetorician had pruned it of tautology, eliminated contradictions, added the necessary logical definitions, which Nestorius unhappily eschewed, and reduced its length by a half or three quarters. Still, even in a morass of verbiage, the *Bazaar* is a document that merits careful consideration. The first book, which is devoted to a metaphysical analysis of Nestorius' first principles, is altogether unique, and constitutes the subtlest and most penetrating study of the mystery of the incarnation in the whole of patristic literature.

3. TERMINOLOGICAL COMPLEXITIES AND AMBIGUITIES

Nestorius fell into disrepute primarily because of his theory of the elements that made up the person of Jesus Christ, who was both perfect God and perfect man. The view authorized at Chalcedon in 451 was that in Jesus Christ there

⁸ Cf. note 2 *supra*. The Council of Ephesus deliberately, it seems, withheld approval from Cyril's *Third Letter to Nestorius*: *ACO* (see note 2 *supra*), 1, 1, 1 (Berlin-Leipzig, 1927-30), 33-42; *ibid.*, 1, 2 (*ibid.*, 1925-26), 45-51; 1, 3 (*ibid.*, 1929), 26-35; P.G., 77, 105 ff. As Joseph Hefele-H. Leclercq, *Histoire des conciles*, 2, 1 (Paris, 1908), 301 note 2, say, there is no record that the letter was acclaimed or approved at Ephesus. According to *ACO*, 1, 2, 51.34, it was merely incorporated into the *Acta*. Bishop Hypatius of Ephesus pointed out at a conference held in Constantinople in 532, that the Council of Chalcedon had expressly withheld approval from Cyril's *Twelve anathemas* (which form an appendix to the *Third Letter*): *ACO*, 4, 2, 169-84; n.b. 173.18 ff., 21-29; 175.33-38; 177.10-17. On Hypatius, see Charles Moeller, "Le chalcédonisme et le néo-chalcédonisme en Orient de 451 à la fin du vi^e siècle," *Das Konzil von Chalkedon*, 1 (cited in note 1 *supra*), 661; Marcel Richard, "Le néo-chalcédonisme," *Mélanges de science religieuse*, 3 (1946), 158 f. For the literature on the twelve anathemas, see Quasten, *Patrology*, 3, 134. Jean Gouillard, "Hypatios d'Éphèse ou du Pseudo-Denys à Théodore Studite," *Revue des études byzantines*, 19 (*Mélanges Raymond Janin*) (Paris, 1961), 63-75, and the literature there cited deal with other aspects of Hypatius' activity, not with the problem at issue here.

Diepen, *Douze dialogues* (see note 66 *infra*), 49-126, makes a valiant but unsuccessful attempt to prove, against just about all of the major authorities, that the *Twelve Anathemas* (and Cyril's *Third Letter to Nestorius* as a whole) had received oecumenical endorsement at Ephesus and Chalcedon. He has found no evidence prior to 553 which indicates that these texts were used as oecumenically valid criteria of Christological orthodoxy.

were two natures, one divine and one human, which together formed one hypostasis or person (prosopon).⁹ Nestorius granted that there were two natures in Christ. But he held that each nature (physis) implied an οὐσία (substance or essence), an ὑπόστασις (hypostasis),¹⁰ and a prosopon, so that there were in Christ two natures, two substances (or essences), two hypostases (which he often omits), and two prosopa.¹¹ Cyril and his school admitted that each nature involved a substance, for these terms were synonymous in the Christological usage of the fifth century;¹² and they agreed that each nature had an hypostasis and a prosopon.

⁹ The text of the Creed of 451 is to be found in *ACO*, 2, 1, 2, 129 [325]f.; J. B. Mansi, *Sacrorum conciliorum nova et amplissima collectio*, 7 (Florence, 1762), 116ABC, or in any of the numerous editions of H. Denzinger-I. B. Umberg, *Enchiridion symbolorum*, e.g., ed. 28 (Freiburg im Br., 1947), no. 148, p. 70f.; T. Herbert Bindley, *The Oecumenical Documents of the Faith*, 4th ed. by F. W. Green (London, 1950), 183–99, with introduction, translation, and notes. For commentary, see J. N. D. Kelly, *Early Christian doctrines*, 2nd ed. (London, 1960), 338–43; R. V. Sellers, *The Council of Chalcedon* (London, 1953); Aloys Grillmeier, “Die theologische und sprachliche Vorbereitung der christologischen Formel von Chalkedon,” *Das Konzil von Chalkedon*, 1 (cited in note 1 *supra*), 1, 5–202; Ignacio Ortiz de Urbina, “Das Symbol von Chalkedon, sein Text, sein Werden, seine dogmatische Bedeutung,” *ibid.*, 1, 389–418; Wilhelm de Vries, “Die syrisch-nestorianische Haltung zu Chalkedon,” *ibid.*, 1, 603–35. In the text which follows I reproduce Schwartz’s edition, *loc. cit.*, except that after the second ὁμοούσιον I read τὸν αὐτὸν ἡμῖν instead of ἡμῖν τὸν αὐτόν.

Ἐπόμενοι τοίνυν τοῖς ἁγίοις πατράσιν ἓνα καὶ τὸν αὐτὸν ὁμολογεῖν υἱὸν τὸν κύριον ἡμῶν Ἰησοῦν Χριστὸν συμφώνως ἅπαντες ἐκδιδάσκομεν, τέλειον τὸν αὐτὸν ἐν θεότητι καὶ τέλειον τὸν αὐτὸν ἐν ἀνθρωπότητι, θεὸν ἀληθῶς καὶ ἀνθρώπον ἀληθῶς τὸν αὐτόν, ἐκ ψυχῆς λογικῆς καὶ σώματος, ὁμοούσιον τῷ πατρὶ κατὰ τὴν θεότητα, καὶ ὁμοούσιον τὸν αὐτὸν ἡμῖν κατὰ τὴν ἀνθρωπότητα, κατὰ πάντα ὅμοιον ἡμῖν χωρὶς ἁμαρτίας· πρὸ αἰώνων μὲν ἐκ τοῦ πατρὸς γεννηθέντα κατὰ τὴν θεότητα, ἐπ’ ἐσχάτων δὲ τῶν ἡμερῶν τὸν αὐτὸν δι’ ἡμᾶς καὶ διὰ τὴν ἡμετέραν σωτηρίαν ἐκ Μαρίας τῆς παρθένου τῆς θεοτόκου κατὰ τὴν ἀνθρωπότητα, ἓνα καὶ τὸν αὐτὸν Χριστόν, υἱόν, κύριον, μονογενῆ, ἐν δύο φύσεσιν, ἀσυγχύτως, ἀτρέπτως, ἀδιαίρετως, ἀχωρίστως γινωριζόμενον· οὐδαμοῦ τῆς τῶν φύσεων διαφορᾶς ἀνηρημένης διὰ τὴν ἑνωσιν, σφολομένης δὲ μᾶλλον τῆς ιδιότητος ἑκατέρας φύσεως καὶ εἰς ἓν πρόσωπον καὶ μίαν ὑπόστασιν συντρεχούσης, οὐκ εἰς δύο πρόσωπα μεριζόμενον ἢ διαιρούμενον, ἀλλ’ ἓνα καὶ τὸν αὐτὸν υἱὸν μονογενῆ θεὸν λόγον κύριον Ἰησοῦν Χριστόν, καθάπερ ἄνωθεν οἱ προφῆται περὶ αὐτοῦ καὶ αὐτὸς ἡμᾶς Ἰησοῦς Χριστὸς ἐξεπαίδευσεν καὶ τὸ τῶν πατέρων ἡμῖν παραδέδωκε σύμβολον.

¹⁰ Nestorius uses this term less frequently than he does the others, but he links it with them: *Bazaar*, 163, 208, 218f., 228.

¹¹ *Ibid.*, 163, 170, 218f., 262.

¹² On the history and development of this technical vocabulary, see Ernst Hammerschmidt, “Ursprung philosophisch-theologischer Termini und deren Übernahme in die altkirchliche Theologie,” *Ostkirchliche Studien*, 8 (1959), 202–20; *idem*, “Eine Definition von ‘Hypostasis’ und ‘Ousia’ während des 7. allgemeinen Konzils: Nikaia II 787,” *ibid.*, 5 (1956), 52–55; *idem*, “Hypostasis und verwandte Begriffe in den Bekenntnisschriften des Gennadios II. von Konstantinopel und des Metrophanes Krito-pulos,” *Oriens Christianus*, 40 = 4. S. 4 (1956), 78–93; *idem*, “Die Begriffsentwicklung in der altkirchlichen Theologie zwischen dem ersten allgemeinen Konzil von Nizäa (325) und dem zweiten allgemeinen Konzil von Konstantinopel (381),” *Theologische Revue*, 51 (1955), 145–54; *idem*, “Einige philosophisch-theologische Grundbegriffe bei Leontios von Byzanz, Johannes von Damaskus und Theodor Abū Qurra,” *Ostkirchliche Studien*, 4 (1955), 78–93; Heinrich Dörrie, *Hypostasis, Wort- und Bedeutungsgeschichte, Nachrichten*, Göttingen, 1, Philologisch-hist. Kl. (1955), Nr. 3: concentrates on ancient, but does not neglect Christian, usage; contains references to texts but not to literature; G. L. Prestige, *God in Patristic Thought*, 2nd ed. (London, 1952), see index; Juan L. Oreja, “Terminología patristica de la Encarnación,” *Helmantica*, 2 (Salamanca, 1951), 129–60; M. Nédoncelle, “Proso-pon et persona dans l’antiquité classique,” *Revue des sciences religieuses*, 22 (1948), 277–99; Marcel Richard, “L’introduction du mot ‘hypostase’ dans la théologie de l’incarnation,” *Mélanges de science religieuse*, 2 (1945), 5–32, 243–70; A. Grandsire, “Nature et hypostases divines dans saint Basile,” *Recherches de science religieuse*, 13 (1923), 130–52; A. Michel, “Hypostase,” *Dictionnaire de théologie catholique*, 7, 1 (Paris, 1921), 369–437; Louis Rougier, “Le sens des termes οὐσία, ὑπόστασις et πρόσωπον dans les controverses trinitaires post-nicéennes,” *Revue de l’histoire des religions*, 74 (1916), 48–63; 133–89; J. Tixeront, “Essais et notices: des concepts de ‘nature’ et de ‘personne’ dans les Pères et les écrivains ecclésiastiques des v^e et vi^e siècles,” *Revue d’histoire et de littérature religieuses*, 8 (1903), 582–92; T. B. Strong, “The History of the Theological Term ‘Substance’,” *Journal of Theological Studies*, 2 (1901), 224–35; 3 (1902), 22–40; 4 (1903), 28–45.

On the Latin use of these terms, cf. my “Some Aspects of Byzantine Influence on Latin Thought,” *Twelfth Century Europe and the Foundations of Modern Society*, edd. Marshall Clagett, Gaines Post, and Robert H. Reynolds (Madison, 1961), 133, 165 note 11, 182 note 97.

But they differed radically from Nestorius in the Christological formula to which this logic led them, and attacked him because they thought that, when he spoke of two natures, he divided Christ into two, and was accordingly making the monstrous error of introducing a fourth member into the Trinity. Therefore, they felt bound to deny, not without equivocation, that there were two natures in Jesus Christ, and taught that there was "only one incarnate nature [or hypostasis] of God the Word." In so doing, they were making physis the equivalent of what the Chalcedonian Symbol called a prosopon or hypostasis, and alleged that this "one *incarnate* nature of God the Word" necessarily implied the two natures. Nestorius was puzzled by this terminology for many reasons, but in part because he himself followed the fathers of the Nicene period, who had treated hypostasis, usia, and physis as synonyms.

4. NESTORIUS' METAPHYSICAL AND CHRISTOLOGICAL PRESUPPOSITIONS

As stated *supra*, Nestorius' Christology appears to be diametrically opposed to Cyril's. But we shall not be able to evaluate it without determining carefully what Nestorius meant by the terminology he used. It should be noted at the outset that, in the first Book of the *Bazaar*, and frequently thereafter, he denounces the Jews, the Manichaeans, the Arians, the Sabellians, and the Apollinarians. In addition, he expressly condemns Paul of Samosata and the notion that there were two sons.

He based his theological system on the hypothesis that every independently existing object, thing, animal, or person, including man and God the Logos, has a substance or essence (usia)¹³ of its own, as the indispensable underlying factor, from which it derives life or existence. The usia, which is invisible, is what the object is in itself, in its inmost being, apart from being perceived. Each usia, in turn, he thought, has a distinctive nature (physis), i.e., the totality of qualities, features, attributes, and peculiarities (both positive and negative) which give it its individual stamp or character. Every nature is founded upon its own usia; there is no nature without an usia; and no usia without a nature. Thus, usia and nature are correlative terms, each of which implies and requires the other.

But neither the usia nor the nature is fully present or effective without a third equally indispensable element, the prosopon. None of the three can be

¹³ For the definition of these terms, see *Bazaar*, 10-86. I am greatly indebted to A. R. Vine's *An Approach to Christology* and to Luigi I. Scipioni's *Ricerche* (cited in note 1 *supra*) for valuable assistance in the study of Nestorius' terminology. The latter is prevented on ecclesiastical grounds from rehabilitating Nestorius. The former comes closer to my position, although he is convinced that Nestorius was not really orthodox. Vine would have exerted a greater influence had it not been for the occasional austerity of his style in passages like (p. 171): "The quasi-prosopon of the syntax in the case of a voluntary syntactic unity which includes a dominating animate nature is necessarily identical with the allogenuous prosopon of that dominating animate nature. In the case of the syntax Jesus Christ the dominating animate nature is God the Word. Jesus Christ, then, is the allogenuous prosopon of God the Word, and holds a place in the continuity of His durative prosopon. Indeed, during the duration of the syntax Jesus Christ, God the Word remained continuously in that syntax, so that for that entire period His prosopon was an allogenuous prosopon, the quasi-prosopon of the syntax Jesus Christ. Jesus Christ, therefore, may be regarded as a syntax with a quasi-prosopon, or as the allogenuous prosopon of God the Word during a certain period. Anything or anyone of which God the Word made use as an allogenuous prosopon would similarly be a syntax with a quasi-prosopon which was also the allogenuous prosopon of the God the Word"

separated from the other two, nor can the *usia* and the nature be recognized externally apart from the *prosopon* (see § 5 *infra*), which reveals them.¹⁴ No ordinary entity or individual being has more than one each of these three components, nor does any one of the three have more than one each of the other two.

From this metaphysical structure, which may have been influenced in part by Stoicism, presumably via the Cappadocian fathers,¹⁵ Nestorius derives his fundamental presupposition that the substance of God the Word and that of the manhood of Christ were both complete in themselves. They were "whole" natures, because the human could have become man by the creative power of God, without union with the divinity, and the latter was altogether independent of the former. On this account, he rejects Cyril's comparison of the union of God and man in Christ with that of body and soul in man. For soul and body are brought together in man, Nestorius says, by constraint, by an act of divine creation, whereas God and man in Christ joined in a union that was voluntary on the part of both participants. On the other hand, when body and soul are united, each is complemented by the other, since "the body has need of the soul that it may live, for it lives not of itself, and the soul has need of the body that it may perceive."¹⁶

It is not improbable, of course, that the tension between Nestorius and Cyril affected the former's attitude in this matter to some extent. Nevertheless, Nestorius' definition of *usia* and *physis* lay at the foundation of his Christological theorem that neither God the Word nor the human nature of Christ was combined with the other in its own nature or *usia*. They were mutually exclusive, or "alien to one another,"¹⁷ so that neither could have served as the basis of union for the other. Hence, it was impossible for them to be joined together except through a third medium, the *prosopon*. For, according to him, this was the only vehicle of union¹⁸ that was capable of preserving the properties of the two *usiai* and natures of Christ inviolate. This was for him essential, since otherwise Christ could not have been both perfect God and perfect man.

His proof of the unsuitability of the two natures (or *usiai*) as centers for the union illustrates the theory that lay behind his doctrine of the prosopic union. Natures (or *usiai*) cannot be combined, or changed in any way, he claims, without serious damage¹⁹ to one or the other of them. For, either the one will be

¹⁴ *Bazaar*, 158. There is no external *prosopon* which lacks an *usia* and a nature of its own: *ibid.*, 208f., 220, 245-247, 228, 231; cf. 163, 170, 174, 216, 218f., 261f., 309, 322.

¹⁵ Grillmeier, "Das Scandalum," cited in note 1 *supra*, 339ff., would trace the Stoic elements in Nestorius' metaphysics to the Cappadocians. See also Scipioni, *Ricerche* (note 1 *supra*), 15-24, 31-44, 98-109, 133-37; Endre Ivánka, *Hellenisches und christliches im frühbyzantinischen Geistesleben* (Vienna, 1948), 84ff.; R. Arnou, "Nestorianisme et néoplatonisme," *Gregorianum*, 17 (1936), 116-31.

¹⁶ *Bazaar*, 304, 161. On the union between the divine and human as voluntary, see *ibid.*, 37f., 47, 85, 90f., 163, 179, 182, 184, 304. For Cyril's comparison of the incarnation to the union of body and soul in man, see P.G., 77, 225 B; cf. Hubert du Manoir de Juaye, *Dogme et spiritualité chez saint Cyrille d'Alexandrie* (Paris, 1944), 138ff.

¹⁷ *Bazaar*, 298f.

¹⁸ *Ibid.*, 23, 53f., 89, 143f., 145, 17f., 147, 157-59, 160f., 166f., 170, 174, 189-91, 196, 206f., 214-16, 219-20, 231, 240f., 246f., 262, 299, 308f., 310f., 313f., 319-20. Cf. 33ff., 37-39.

¹⁹ *Ibid.*, 27.6-8, 28-36.

absorbed by the other, or the result of their combination will be some third nature that is different from both of them.

If, for example, God should take flesh into his own *usia*, he would not truly become man because he is "not of the nature of men."²⁰ Still worse, since the Godhead is characterized by lack of body or flesh, if God were to admit flesh or body into his *usia*, he would cease to be God.²¹ Similarly, if Christ's manhood were to take God into its *usia*, there would be no incarnation of God,²² but rather the obliteration of the human nature, the deification of man, and the addition of alien matter to the Trinity. That is, as he puts it, things which are changed from their original *usia* possess only the nature into which they have been changed, and cease to be what they formerly had been.²³ He enunciates this principle also in dealing with Moses' miracle of changing the water of the Nile into blood. In that case, he was of the opinion that the Nile had become blood in *usia* for the Egyptians, but had been changed back into water for the Hebrews when they used it.²⁴

Normally, however, and especially with regard to the divine and the human *usiai* in Christ, he took such changes of *usia* to be impossible since "there are no means whereby the *usia* which was should cease to be, nor whereby that which was made should become unmade, . . . nor again whereby a nature which was not should come into being, nor whereby that which is not eternal should become eternal either by a change of nature or by confusion or by mixture; or whereby from the *usia* of the eternal should come into being that which is not eternal."²⁵ Therefore, he concludes, the uncreated God the Word, who is eternal, cannot be transformed into that which is created (body), nor can the human body of Christ be changed into the *usia* of God the Word. On these premises, also, he rejects Cyril's formula of a "natural union" or "hypostatic union" in Christ, both of which, in his estimation, involved a mixture and confusion of natures or hypostases, and consequently an impairment of their integrity that would have been fatal to both the divine and human natures of Christ (cf. notes 19ff., 46f.).

5. THE PROSOPIC UNION

So, when he says that God the Word became man, he means that the manhood of Jesus formed a distinct *usia* alongside the *usia* of God, and that the two were joined together in the *prosopon*.²⁶ But he never even suggested that there were two persons in Christ, as his enemies allege, and, hence, four (a quaternity) in what tradition called a Trinity. This charge he spiritedly repudiates, and reiterates many times that

²⁰ *Ibid.*, 20-23.

²¹ *Ibid.*, 14.

²² *Ibid.*, 23-26; cf. note 25 *infra*.

²³ *Ibid.*, 17f.

²⁴ *Ibid.*, 18f.

²⁵ *Ibid.*, 26f., 36f., 80f., 182, 220.

²⁶ *Ibid.*, 1, 1, 27 and 29, cf. 18, pp. 20, 21f., 22f., 15; 55, 166, 210, 233, 236, 247.

“no one else than he who was in the bosom of his Father came and became flesh and dwelt among us; and he is in the bosom of his Father and with us, in that he is what the Father is, and he has expounded unto us what he is in the bosom of his Father. . . .”²⁷

Such texts abound and, he confesses, in conformity with the Creed of 451,

“in one Christ two natures without confusion. By one nature on the one hand, that is [by that] of the divinity, he was born of God the Father; by the other, on the other hand, that is, [by that] of the humanity, [he was born] of the holy virgin.”²⁸

In view of these express and unambiguous declarations, there can be no doubt that Nestorius firmly believed “that there is of the divinity and of the humanity one Christ and one Lord and one Son . . .,” and that “there both exists and is named one Christ, the two of them [i.e., the natures] being united, he who was born of the Father in the divinity, and of the holy virgin in the humanity, for there was a union of the two natures.”²⁹

He frequently refers to this union of the two natures³⁰ in the one prosopon of Jesus Christ, and denies that it should be described as a union of prosopa.³¹ Most significantly of all, he envisaged this union in impeccably orthodox fashion. What he says³² is that the human Jesus “received his prosopon as something created, in such wise as not originally to be man but at the same time Man-God by the incarnation [ἐνανθρώπησις] of God” This is an extremely subtle description of the oneness of Jesus Christ, and shows that Nestorius conceived the Man-God to have been the divine Logos, plus what would have become the separate individual man Jesus, if the Logos had not been united with him from the moment of conception. For the child born of the Virgin was at no time, Nestorius states, a separate man but “at the same time Man-God.”

In addition, in the very next sentence he adds, “He [i.e., the Man-God] indeed was the Maker of all, the law-giver, . . . the glory, the honour and the power; he was also the second man [the ‘New Adam,’ as in Romans 5:14ff.; I Cor. 15:22 and 45, i.e., Jesus] with qualities complete and whole, so that God was his prosopon while he was in God.” This is a favorite subject with him, and he repeatedly gives utterance to his conviction that in Jesus Christ God and man were one (cf. notes 27f., 34, 41, 43), as when he argues that the “child [the human Jesus] and the Lord of the child [the divine Logos] are the same.”³³

²⁷ *Ibid.*, 50; cf. 53, 192f.

²⁸ *Ibid.*, 296.

²⁹ *Ibid.*, 295f. Nestorius’ meaning is more clearly expressed in the translation by F. Nau, *op. cit.*, note 1 *supra*, 262: “Il y a et on reconnaît un seul Christ, les deux (natures) étant unies, lequel est né du Père selon la divinité et de la Vierge sainte selon l’humanité, car il y a eu union des deux natures.”

³⁰ *Ibid.*, 58, 79f., 89, 143, 148, 156f., 161, 163, 172, 182, 295ff., 300–302, 308, 310, 314f.

³¹ *Ibid.*, 156, 172, 224.

³² *Ibid.*, 1, 1, 64, p. 60; cf. 92.1f., 237, 304. Although Nestorius frequently refers to what seems to be the *assumptus homo* (as *ibid.*, 237f.), the texts cited show that he understood by the “man assumed” nothing more than the human nature of Christ. See also following note.

³³ *Ibid.*, 230ff. N. b. 45 (“he who judges and is judged is the judge Who is it who has accepted the offering for all men, when it is he who accepts and he who is offered?”); 200 (“he who descended is the same whom the Father has sanctified and sent into the world”); 207 (the “taker” and the “taken”

Such texts are re-inforced by his statement, "We say not one and another, for there is one prosopon of both natures," by which Nestorius gives sanction to the orthodox doctrine that the divine and human in Jesus Christ should not be taken to be masculine in gender, ἄλλος καὶ ἄλλος, or ἕτερος καὶ ἕτερος, or *alius* and *alius*, as of two separate persons, but neuter, ἄλλο and ἄλλο, or *aliud* and *aliud*, of the two separate "things," i.e., natures or usiai, which were united in Jesus Christ.

Had his critics taken these passages into account, they could not have persisted in denouncing him as a heretic, especially in the face of his oft-repeated and passionate denial³⁴ that there were two Sons or Lords or Christs. Nor could they have accused him of having been committed to the doctrine that the human prosopon assumed by the divine Logos constituted a separate man, the *assumptus homo*, who lived by the side of the Logos during the incarnation—and therefore amounted to a second Son and a "fourth member of the Trinity."

Nevertheless, in order to do full justice to both sides, let us examine the objections that have been made against Nestorius, even if they must be regarded as deprived of all substance not only by the text quoted above but also by the emphasis he lays upon the union of the two natures and the oneness of Jesus Christ, as at notes 27–29 above and elsewhere.

Hostility towards Nestorius arises because, although he describes the union as taking place only in the prosopon, which he defines innumerable times as one in number (see note 43), he also makes reference to two prosopa (that of the divine nature and that of the human) and occasionally also to a "union of the prosopa."³⁵ Even when he does so, however, he immediately explains, in the same context, that the latter "took place for the prosopon" and that there was only "one prosopon of the two natures."

Such explanations demonstrate both that Nestorius did not conceive of the two prosopa which he mentions as in any way compromising the unity or oneness of Jesus Christ, and that he uses the word prosopon in two different senses. According to one usage (*sense A*), prosopon—i.e., what may be called the natural or external prosopon, means the exterior aspect or appearance of a thing, not opposed to its genuine character, but, in the words of a modern critic, "as an objectively real element in its being . . . , without which, or if it were other than it is, the thing would not be what it is."³⁶ This is the more general significance of the word (see notes 12 and 14 *supra*). When applied to the two natures in Jesus Christ it indicates, not that each nature had a separate,

are one, not two); 233. Nestorius' denial that there were in Christ "one and another" (masculine) is to be found *ibid.*, 200–201 (n.b. the Greek text Nestorius had in mind in quoting these words), 209, 224, 237. On the orthodox affirmation of the same principle, see Eduard Weigl, *Christologie vom Tode des Athanasius bis zum Ausbruch des nestorianischen Streites*, 373–429 (*Münchener Studien zur historischen Theologie*, 4 [Munich, 1925]), 45, 47, 57f., 108f., 112, 152; J. N. D. Kelly, *Early Christian doctrines*, 297; Sellers, *Two Ancient Christologies*, 72f.; cf. my "Some aspects of Byzantine influence on Latin thought," *Twelfth Century Europe* (see note 12 *supra*), 161f.

³⁴ *Bazaar*, 47–50, 146, 160, 189–91, 196, 209f., 215, 224f., 227, 237f., 295–302, 314, 317.

³⁵ *Ibid.*, 218–20; cf. 163, 246, 252, 261f., 302, 309; and note 40 *infra*.

³⁶ *Ibid.*, 414–16. Cf. the texts cited in notes 11 and 14 *supra*.

independent existence (as a person), but that each had a substantive reality, recognizable in its distinctive qualities, which remained undiminished after the union. Hence, *prosopon* in *sense A* is to be understood as nothing but another aspect of *physis* or *usia*, to which, as we have seen (notes 12–14 *supra*), it is inextricably bound.

The other kind of *prosopon* (*sense B*) is an approximate equivalent of our word “person” and occurs in the *Bazaar of Heracleides* as the designation for Jesus Christ, “the common *prosopon* of the two natures.”³⁷

Let us now see how Nestorius applies these definitions to the union. “Man,” he says, taking *prosopon* in *sense A* as above defined, “is known by the human *prosopon*, that is, by the *schema* [outward form] of the body and by the likeness, but God by the name which is more excellent than all names, and by the adoration of all creation and by the confession [of him] as God.”³⁸ That is, every individual man is identified as such and distinguished from his fellows by the physical characteristics of his appearance. These constitute his *prosopon* (*sense A*). But the *prosopon* (*sense A*) of God, who is invisible, is recognized in a different way—by his glorious name and by the fact that he is acknowledged to be God. More specifically, to refer to one of the most significant paragraphs in the *Bazaar* (see note 32 *supra*), the *prosopon* of the divine nature (*sense A*) was God the Logos himself.

On the basis of these definitions, Nestorius maintains that, as a result of the union, a transfer of attributes (*communicatio idiomatum*: see § 6 *infra*) took place. God the Logos (understood as the *prosopon* in *sense A* of the divine nature) became the *prosopon* of Jesus Christ’s human nature (note 32 *supra*). Nestorius sets forth the same idea somewhat differently when he says, citing Philippians 2: 9–11, that the divine Word of God gave the human nature of Jesus Christ his name so that, “at the name of Jesus every knee should bow which is in heaven and on the earth, and every tongue should confess that Jesus is the Lord.”³⁹ Likewise as a consequence of the union, the Logos united with his divine nature the flesh—the body and appearance (i.e., the *prosopon* in *sense A* of the human nature). Or, to adopt one of Nestorius’ favorite expressions, “the divinity makes use of the *prosopon* of the humanity, and the humanity of that of the divinity.”⁴⁰

These two *prosopa* (*sense A*), which, it will be remembered, were intimately connected, but not identical, with the two natures themselves, fulfilled the functions assigned them by Nestorius (see notes 14 and 36 *supra*). For they were the characteristic or visible elements by which the divine and human natures, respectively, were made apparent to the observer in all of their aspects. Hence, Nestorius was enabled to define the union of the two natures in the one *prosopon* (*sense B*) of Jesus Christ, the incarnate divine Logos,

³⁷ *Ibid.*, 319, 58, 148, 166, 170f., 220.

³⁸ *Ibid.*, 1, 1, 66, p. 61; *ibid.*, 64f., 67, pp. 60–62. Cf. pp. 55, 58f., 70, 89, 165–67, 246–49, 312–15. Hodgson, *ibid.*, 415f., ingeniously explains that the union of the *prosopa* is of two natures and *usiai*, “which nevertheless are identical in appearance,” so that the “appearances overlap.” But this would be an illusion, not the true union which Nestorius had in mind.

³⁹ *Ibid.*, 1, 1, 65, p. 61.

⁴⁰ *Ibid.*, 58, 207, 220, 240f. (quotation).

in terms of their external revelation through their prosopa (*sense A*). In addition, the two prosopa (*sense A*) served as media for the *communicatio idiomatum*. But in no respect did they connote a division or bifurcation into two separate persons. For Nestorius carefully adds (see note 40) so as to avoid "Nestorian" implications: "and thus we say one prosopon [i.e., in *sense B*] in both of them. Thus God appears whole, since his nature is not damaged in aught owing to the union; and thus, too, man [is] whole, falling short of naught of the activity and of the sufferings of his own nature owing to the union."

The last sentence indicates that Nestorius had not fallen into the error of supposing that the union of God and man in Jesus Christ, the *one* common prosopon (in *sense B*), which unites the two usiai and natures, was in any way illusory or involved a diminution of the fullness and perfection of either the divine or the human nature. This is a point to which he frequently returns, as when he says⁴¹ of Jesus Christ, "He is truly God, . . . in naught falling short of the nature of the Father; and we confess that the man is truly man, completely in his nature, in naught falling short of the nature of men, neither in body nor in soul nor in intelligence" Likewise, he adds elsewhere, "God indeed remained God and was made man, and man remained man and was made God; for they took the prosopon of one another, and not the natures."

Similarly (cf. notes 27-32 *supra*), in the language of the Creed of 325 Nestorius unequivocally identifies the one Lord Jesus Christ, "the only-begotten Son of God, that is, from the ousia of God the Father. God from God and Light of Light, Very God of Very God, born and not made, consubstantial with the Father, by whom all that is in heaven and in earth was made," with the same one Lord Jesus Christ, who "on account of us men and on account of our salvation came down and was made flesh of the Holy Spirit and of the Virgin Mary, who also was made man . . . , suffered and rose on the third day and ascended into heaven and will come to judge the living and the dead"—he who is "consubstantial with the Father" and "consubstantial with the mother, one Lord Jesus Christ."

At the same time, the quotations at notes 32-34, 37-40 show that Nestorius kept well within the permissible limits of orthodox theology in describing the difference between the two natures in Christ. The incarnation is a mystery, and cannot be made comprehensible in purely logical terms. But it would be difficult to conceive of a description that is, under the circumstances, more explicit or more orthodox than Nestorius'.

This point can best be proved by a brief review of his analysis of the unity of the two natures and usiai in one prosopon, the prosopon of union (*sense B*), Jesus Christ,⁴² to the oneness of which he testifies uncompromisingly.⁴³ The prosopon of the human nature (*sense A*) was the visible manhood of Jesus, not merely his outward physical features, and signified the whole of his human individuality, with all the qualities that go to make up a perfect man. The

⁴¹ *Ibid.*, 233, 220. For Nestorius' treatment of the Nicene Creed, see *ibid.*, 144f.; cf. note 70 *infra*.

⁴² *Ibid.*, 23, 53, 55, 58, 64, 66, 89, 143, 145-49, 156-59, 161, 164f., 166f., 174, 182f., 189, 196, 201f., 207, 214, 216, 220, 227, 230ff., 235f., 246f., 252ff., 258, 260ff., 299, 301, 308ff., 313f., 315, 318, 319.

⁴³ *Ibid.*, 58, 148, 166, 170f., 220, 236, 240, 246, 252, 310, 319.

prosopon of the manhood, thus understood, revealed by Christ's miracles the invisible divine nature of the eternal God the Word, who has neither physical form nor shape, but was fully present in the common prosopon (*sense B*) Jesus Christ, and manifested himself behind the cloak of flesh through his prosopon (in *sense A*), by the exertion of divine power.

Consequently, in Nestorius' system, the prosopon (*sense A*) of the divine nature, which was actually God the Logos himself, as we have seen, was recognized by the performance of divine acts and the manifestation of omnipotence, as we should say, or as he himself expresses it (note 38f.), by the name of God, "the adoration of all creation," and "confession of him as God." This language was intended, it would seem, to emphasize the immateriality of God and to explain how the divine Logos could be united with the humanity of Jesus without any objectionable duality of person. But, it must be emphasized, this is only Nestorius' way of defining the indefinable prosopon of God the Logos in Christ, whom he represents consistently (see *supra*, notes 27-29, 41, *infra*, 51ff.) as no mere external power or spirit, but truly the divine, eternal Logos, who descended from heaven and was joined with the human nature in the womb of the Virgin.

Thus, to the one prosopon,⁴⁴ the "common prosopon of our Lord Jesus Christ, the only-begotten Son of God," Nestorius referred "all the [properties] of God the Word whose nature is impassible and is immortal and eternal, and all the [properties] of the humanity, which are a nature mortal and passible and created, and those of the union and of the incarnation. . . ." For⁴⁵ in Jesus Christ "the earthly and the heavenly, the visible and the invisible, the limited and the unlimitable are the same." These formulations, which vie with the Oecumenical Creeds in lucidity and exactitude, can apply only to what we should call a single person, the God-Man Jesus Christ, who is simultaneously perfect God and perfect man—the divine Logos, who became man and was known on earth through the prosopa (*sense A*) described *supra*.

According to Nestorius, therefore, Jesus Christ was the divine Logos incarnate, the Son of God in the flesh,^{45a} the Lord whom his disciples knew as a man but recognized to be God. The unity of his "personality" was further guaranteed by the fact that it was the Logos who both "gave" his prosopon (*sense A*) to the human nature and "took" that of the human for his own. Moreover, the human will of Christ (see notes 51-55a *infra*) was always obedient to the divine, so that there never was any conflict or division between the two.

This analysis is a legitimate summary of Nestorius' Christology, which he himself, however, never presents systematically. Nor does he ever differentiate the "common prosopon" of Jesus Christ from the two prosopa (*sense A*), except by his constant emphasis upon its oneness or indivisibility and upon its having been the vehicle of the union of the two natures or the "common prosopon of the two natures" (*supra*, notes 30f., 37, 42f.). He obviously felt that

⁴⁴ *Ibid.*, 171.

⁴⁵ *Ibid.*, 230f.

^{45a} *Ibid.*, 60f., 191, 193, 196-8, 200-1, 237. On the Logos' "giving" and "taking," see *ibid.*, 55, 61, 69, 165, 225.

these distinctions were in themselves decisive, and he would have been astounded by the hypersubtlety of the scholars (cf. note 13 *supra*) who have tried to speak for him in this matter—in language that he would have found utterly incomprehensible.

It is hardly necessary to add that his failure to attempt a more fully articulated metaphysical analysis of the “common prosopon of Jesus Christ” (*sense B*) is neither surprising nor in the slightest degree heretical. The Chalcedonian Symbol (see note 9 *supra*) merely affirms the oneness of the prosopon or hypostasis and denies that it was divided into two. Nestorius is far more explicit than his contemporaries, none of whom expounds the incarnation so fully as he does, or lays greater stress upon the oneness and unity of Jesus Christ.

Nestorius’ deep personal commitment to the unity of Christ is demonstrated also by his acceptance of the Cyrillian idea of the hypostatic union, if hypostasis be defined as a synonym for prosopon and not for *usia*.⁴⁶ On this basis he could indorse the Cappadocian Trinitarian formula, one *usia* in three hypostases, although he himself preferred to speak of one *usia* in three prosopa.⁴⁷

In addition, the quotation at note 32 above constitutes a powerful refutation of the Cyrillian taunt that Nestorius had an inadequate conception of the union of the two natures in Christ, and separated the one from the other spatially. Scorning Nestorius’ specific denials that he ever divided or isolated the natures from each other, Cyril attacks him for saying, “I separate the natures but unite the adoration,”⁴⁸ as if Nestorius meant that, notwithstanding the absence of a real union of the natures, the separate man Jesus deserved to be worshipped because of his close association with the Logos. The verb “separate” (χωρίζω), which Cyril finds offensive, was banned at Chalcedon. But Nestorius replies that he intended it to refer to the distinction between the two natures, since one was divine and the other human, not to any physical or spatial separation between them. Never, Nestorius protests, did he distinguish God the Word from “him that is visible,”⁴⁹ i.e., he never made a division in Jesus Christ as if between the Logos and the man Jesus. Nor did he say that there were two adorations, as if the divine Logos and the human nature of Jesus formed separate persons, and each received worship of his own. On the contrary,⁵⁰ he contends, the adoration in question, like the prosopon of Jesus Christ, was singular in number, though it was quite proper to conceive of the human nature (not a separate man) as being adored together with the divine, with which it was joined in the one prosopon of Jesus Christ.

It was the unity of Christ, furthermore, which made it possible for Nestorius to understand how it was that the will and purpose of Jesus Christ’s human

⁴⁶ *Ibid.*, 156f. but cf. 208, 218.

⁴⁷ *Ibid.*, 247.

⁴⁸ *Ibid.*, 311 ff. See also the texts cited in notes 49–55 *infra*. Cf. Sellers, *op. cit.* (note 1 *supra*), 91–95, 190–200.

⁴⁹ *Ibid.*, 314.

⁵⁰ *Ibid.*, 188f., 196, 202, 207, 227, 237f., 314. For proof of the orthodoxy of Nestorius’ doctrine of the adoration of the human nature of Jesus together with the Word, see Paul Galtier, *De incarnatione et redemptione* (Paris, 1947), §§ 288 ff.

nature were identical with those of God the Word.⁵¹ This identity might have led to the "Nestorian" or adoptionist interpretation that the divinity of Jesus Christ consisted of nothing but his extraordinary submission to the divine will, which won for him the title of Son of God by way of reward or honor, and that the divine in Christ was comparable to the indwelling of God in Moses, the prophets, and the saints.

But Nestorius was not attracted by these notions, and insists that the union in Christ was not merely "moral" but truly metaphysical (see note 55). He does not fail on this account, however, to record the human traits⁵² of Christ as recorded in the Gospels: his birth, low estate, swaddling clothes, "increase in stature and in wisdom with God and with men," suffering, death, and resurrection. Throughout, stress is laid on the Son's obedience, despite travail and temptation, and on his freedom of the will.⁵³ But Nestorius refrains from drawing "Nestorian" conclusions therefrom, rejects the notion that Christ achieved Sonship "as a consequence of moral progress" or by degrees (by adoption after proving his merit)⁵⁴ and traces the identity between the will of Christ's humanity and that of God the Logos to the union of their natures, that is, as he expressly states, to the very moment of Christ's conception.⁵⁵

These pronouncements of Nestorius deserve close scrutiny. He understood by the identity of the divine and human wills in Christ, it should be noted, that the two were in complete harmony with each other, not that the two natures had only a single will between them or that the one had absorbed or obliterated the other. There were two wills, but they made identical decisions. The human will, despite its independence of the divine will, was always actively and deliberately obedient to it, through every trial and vicissitude. Nestorius argues (whether rightly or wrongly it is not my purpose to determine in this paper) that Cyril's treatment of this topic was unsatisfactory. The latter does not, of course, deny that the humanity of Jesus Christ was perfect, and included a human rational faculty, which was endowed with freedom of the will. But, Nestorius charges,^{55a} Cyril ascribes Christ's moral and spiritual victories to the activity and power of the divine Logos, rather than to the free exercise of his human volition. Unless his human will had faced a real moral choice, Nestorius holds, and had responded thereto in genuinely human fashion, Christ could not have had a truly human nature. Nor could his humanity have otherwise been the model, vehicle, and assurance of immortality for all mankind. This conception was basic for Nestorius' soteri-

⁵¹ On identity of the wills: *Bazaar*, 57 (end), 59, 62-68, 70, 163; God was *truly* in Christ, not just as in the saints: 44-46, 203-6, 227; cf. notes 48-55, especially note 50.

⁵² *Ibid.*, 91 ff., 205 f., and *passim*.

⁵³ *Ibid.*, 62-66, 93 f.

⁵⁴ *Ibid.*, 57 (end) f., 59 f., 72, 252 f., cf. 314.

⁵⁵ *Ibid.*, 60.3 ff., 314; cf. 72 (end) and note 50 *supra*.

^{55a} *Ibid.*, 91 ff., 210-12, 240, 247 f. For the argument of Cyril reprehended by Nestorius, see *Sancti Patris Nostri Cyrilli Archiepiscopi Alexandrini in D. Joannis Evangelium*, ed. Philip E. Pusey, 1 (Oxford, 1872), 487. 16-23 (on John 6:38 f.); *ibid.*, 2 (Oxford, 1872), 316-8-317.7, 320.13-23 (on John 12:27 f.); P. G., 73, 532 AB; P. G. 74, 88D-89A, 92D. Cf. Sellers, *op. cit.* (note 1 *supra*), 104 ff. The latter of these texts is deemed not to have been written by Cyril: Liébaert, *op. cit.* (note 66 *infra*), 131-37.

ology. It also serves to illustrate his understanding of the unity of Christ's personality, which, according to him, never experienced dissension or discord since the human will always followed the divine.

6. THEOTOKOS AND THE *Communicatio Idiomatum*

On the basis of the foregoing analysis, we are justified in clearing Nestorius of the charge of "Nestorianism," and can pronounce his theology to be unobjectionable when measured by Chalcedonian criteria. But, some urge, his unwillingness to designate Mary the Virgin as Theotokos without qualification indicates that he failed to comprehend fully the implications of the *communicatio idiomatum* (ἀντιδοσις τῶν ἰδιωμάτων or ὀνομάτων).

This phenomenon, the transfer or exchange of attributes, as defined by the Council of Chalcedon, notably in the Tome of Bishop Leo I (440-61) of Rome (see note 71 *infra*), is exhibited by the two natures of Jesus Christ (the divine and the human). According to orthodox doctrine, these natures are united "without confusion, change, separation, or division" (see note 9 *supra*), and retain all of their properties, which in the union of God and man are distinct from each other but not separate. The difference between the natures had given rise to two appellations of Jesus Christ, who, on account of his divine nature, is Son of God (the divine Logos) and also, at the same time, by virtue of his human nature, the Son of man (Jesus). Whatever the designation, reference is always to one and the same person, Jesus Christ. Strictly speaking, the divine characteristics are attributable to the divine nature and the human to the human. Nevertheless, as a result of the union of the two in one person, it is deemed possible to ascribe the experiences of Jesus Christ in respect of his divine nature to the Son of man, and those which Jesus Christ underwent because of his human nature to the Son of God. Consequently, it was theologically permissible to teach that the "Son of God" (see note 65f. *infra* for further extension of this idea) underwent death, to which the divine nature was not subject, and that the "Son of man" received worship, which is accorded only to God.

Neither the Council of Chalcedon nor Bishop Leo of Rome was less ambiguous or more positive about this doctrine than Nestorius. Like them, he says,⁵⁶ "we name the man God indeed on account of the union of the divinity but man in nature; yet similarly once more also God the Word is God indeed in nature, but we call God man by reason of the union of the prosopon of the humanity."

In support of this proposition, he cites Athanasius⁵⁷ approvingly to the same effect: "Now that the Word has become man and has made the properties of the flesh his own, the same are no longer imputed to the body because the Word has come to be in it." From this, like Athanasius, he concludes that in the union the Logos acquired the characteristics of man, and the human in Christ, in turn,

⁵⁶ *Ibid.*, 248; cf. 180, 228, 233.

⁵⁷ *Ibid.*, 221.

those of God. He specifically states⁵⁸ that he agrees with the orthodox who assign "the [properties] of the humanity to the divinity and those of the divinity to the humanity, and this is said of the one and that of the other, as concerning natures whole and united, united indeed without confusion and making use of the prosopa of one another."

He does not mean of course that such an exchange was actually effected between the two natures, but rather between God the Logos and the human in Christ, through their prosopa. His formula for this transfer is the sentence, "the divinity makes use of the prosopon of the humanity and the humanity of that of the divinity," which recurs repeatedly in the *Bazaar*, in one form or another, and must be ranked high among patristic attempts to define this central mystery of the incarnation.

This was his way of safeguarding the divinity and integrity of the divine nature of the Logos. For it enabled him to attach Jesus Christ's human experiences and agony, which God the Word assumed,⁵⁹ not to the divine nature, but to the human prosopon (*sense A*) which the Logos "used." Hence, in the kenosis⁶⁰ (the "emptying" by which God humiliated himself and took on human form: Philippians 2: 6-11), the Logos endured "death upon the cross, in that he made use of the prosopon of him who died and was crucified as his own prosopon, and [i.e., as a consequence] in his own prosopon he made use of the things which appertained unto him who died and was crucified and was exalted."

Accordingly, he does not question the validity of such traditional affirmations as "God suffered" and "God died," if correctly understood as applying to the human prosopon the divine Logos took, not to his nature. Thus, he recognizes Jesus Christ's two generations (note 28f. *supra*) and confesses⁶¹ of the Logos that "nothing is his own apart from the human humiliation; but while remaining God in all things, [he is] that which the man was by his nature in sufferings, even in impassibility." Or, in other words, the Logos "is impassible in a passible body"⁶² and "truly . . . came to be in the body and was not distinguished from the body."

He was, however, far more persistent than Cyril in pointing out that God the Logos did not undergo the human process in his own nature. For, he shows,⁶³ in the New Testament death and suffering are never associated with God but only with Christ, the Son, or the Lord, since these names are "indicative of two natures

⁵⁸ *Ibid.*, 240f.; see also 81, 174, 182f., 191, 233. For Nestorius' formula for the *communicatio idiomatum*, see *ibid.*, 240, 190, 207, 219f., 233 ("the one is the other and the other the one"), 238; cf. 66, 69, 81, 159, 163, 167, 172, 183, 252, 261, 320.

⁵⁹ *Ibid.*, 174.

⁶⁰ *Ibid.*, 58; cf. 138 ("the Only-begotten Son of God created and was created; the Son of God suffered and suffered not, the same but not in the same [*ousia*]; for [some] of these things are in the nature of the divinity and [others] of them in the nature of the humanity. He suffered all human things in the humanity, and all divine things in the divinity . . ."), 165, 170, 179, 191, 193, 221. On the kenosis, see Paul Henry, "Kénose," *Dictionnaire de la Bible, Supplément*, 5 (Paris, 1957), 7-161.

N. b. that Nestorius' analysis on this point (cf. note 63 *infra*) was accepted by Cyril and the Council of Chalcedon (note 72^a *infra*).

⁶¹ *Bazaar*, 70.

⁶² *Ibid.*, 237.

⁶³ *Ibid.*, 256f.

and indicate sometimes the divinity, but sometimes the humanity and sometimes both of them." Cyril was to be censured, therefore, he felt,⁶⁴ for failing to appreciate adequately the impassibility of the divine nature.

Basically, as Nestorius in part understood, Cyril really was in agreement with him on this point. In his *Second Letter to Nestorius*,⁶⁵ for example, which received oecumenical indorsement at the Councils of Ephesus and Chalcedon, Cyril declared that the Logos, though begotten of the Father before the ages and in no need of a second birth, is *said* (λέγεται) to have been born in the flesh (σαρκικῶς) because he had united himself with human nature. In this sense, the Virgin Mary, who was in no wise, Cyril concedes, the mother or source of God the Word himself or his divine nature, could be regarded as Theotokos, since she gave birth to the flesh to which the Logos was joined in hypostatic union. Likewise, the Logos, who is in his own nature incorporeal, impassible, incorruptible, and immortal, is *said* to have suffered, died, and risen from the dead, because of his union with a human body which underwent these experiences. By this process of reasoning, Cyril evolved a formula,⁶⁶ according to which the Logos submitted to birth, suffering, and death *in the flesh* (σαρκί) or according to the flesh (κατὰ σάρκα). His treatment of the Word's relation to passibility is eminently reasonable, and closely resembles what Nestorius has to say on this subject (see note 72^a *infra*).

Unhappily, the latter, out of the same contrariety which led Cyril to contradict him at every turn, repudiates⁶⁷ Cyril's solution of the problem, and objects⁶⁸ that Cyril referred the qualities of both the human and the divine natures to the eternal Logos but failed to attribute those of God the Word to Christ's manhood. As a consequence, he complains, Cyril was guilty of the Manichaeian error of reducing Christ's flesh to an illusion. This is not the place to analyze Cyril's position on these matters. But Nestorius' animadversions, however unjustified, prove once again that he thoroughly understood the *communicatio idiomatum*, and realized that there could have been no true union of the divine Logos and

⁶⁴ *Ibid.*, 91-94, 136ff., 141-51, 174, 176, 181ff., 188, 191-206, 247, 252-62, 295ff., 323, 362, 364ff., 367f.

⁶⁵ Nestorius insists that Cyril at times agrees with him on the impassibility of the divine nature: *ibid.*, 145, 150, 174, 191, 195, 221f., 232-252, 260, 262, 265f., 296f. For the text of Cyril's Second Letter to Nestorius, see *ACO*, I, I, 1, 25. 23-28. 26; P.G., 77, 44ff.; Bindley, *op. cit.* (note 9 *supra*), 94ff., 209ff.

⁶⁶ See previous note and Cyril's *Third Letter to Nestorius*, *ACO*, I, I, 1, 33-42; P.G., 77, 105-21; ed. and trans. with commentary by Bindley, *op. cit.*, (note 9 *supra*), 106-37, 212-19; n.b. III.149, 165f.; 113.253-70, and the twelfth anathema in this letter. On Cyril's view of the *communicatio idiomatum*, see Georges Jouassard, "Impassibilité du Logos et impassibilité de l'âme humaine chez saint Cyrille d'Alexandrie," *Recherches de science religieuse*, 45 (1957), 209-44, and other articles by him, listed in Quasten, *Patrology*, 3, 141. A warm and erudite defense of Cyril, along with an attack on the theology of the *assumptus homo*, is made by H. M. Diepen, *Douze dialogues de christologie ancienne* (Rome, 1960); *idem*, *La théologie de l'Emmanuel* (n. p., 1960); *idem*, *Aux origines de l'anthropologie de saint Cyrille d'Alexandrie* (n. p., 1957), who directs his fire mostly against Déodat de Basly (see my "Immutability" [note 3 *supra*], 138, note 52). Cf. Paul Galtier, "Saint Cyrille et Apollinaire," *Gregorianum*, 37 (1956), 584-609; Jouassard, *loc. cit.*; and Jacques Liébaert, *La doctrine christologique de saint Cyrille d'Alexandrie avant la querelle nestorienne* (*Mémoires et travaux publiés par les professeurs des facultés catholiques de Lille*, 58 [Lille, 1951]), with all three of whom I agree against Diepen. A precise summary of Cyril's position is to be found in Hubert du Manoir de Juaye, *op. cit.* (note 16 *supra*), 145-50.

⁶⁷ *Bazaar*, 150f.

⁶⁸ *Ibid.*, 146, 219, 225, 239, 240f., 245-48, 260.

the human nature in Jesus Christ unless the qualities of the one were deemed applicable to the other and *vice versa*.

Actually, the fundamental difference between Nestorius and Cyril in interpreting the results of the *communicatio idiomatum* stems from their disagreement concerning the subject of the God-man's career and experience. Cyril, as Nestorius remarks,⁶⁹ preferred to begin with the divine Logos ("the maker of the natures"), and habitually speaks of the Logos as saying, doing, suffering, dying, and rising from the dead. Nestorius, on the other hand, associates all these activities with "the prosopon of the union" (the Jesus Christ of the Gospels). In defence of his position, he appeals to the New Testament (see note 63 *supra*) and the Creed of Nicaea.⁷⁰ The latter, he contends, in a rebuttal of Cyril, ascribes the incarnation, death, and resurrection to Jesus Christ, not to the divine Logos. It should be added, also, that the Symbol of Chalcedon follows the same pattern (see note 9 *supra*), and qualifies the terrestrial generation of Jesus Christ exactly as Nestorius does, stating that he "was born of Mary the Virgin Theotokos, according to the manhood." We cannot censure him for expressing himself with similar circumspection, and there is no doubt that he would have subscribed unreservedly to this Creed and to the Tome of Leo, as one of his followers claims.⁷¹

⁶⁹ *Ibid.*, 143-146, 153 and *passim*.

⁷⁰ *Ibid.*, 141 ff., 144 ff., and *passim*. For the text of the Creed of 325, see *ACO*, 2, 1, 2, 79 [275]. 16 ff. Other versions and the so-called Creed of 381: *ACO*, 1, 1, 1, 12.32-13.5, 35.1-11; *ACO*, 1, 1, 2, 12.29-13.7; *ACO*, 1, 1, 3, 39.1-11; *ACO*, 1, 1, 7, 65 f.; *ACO*, 2, 1, 1, 90.30 ff.; *ACO*, 2, 1, 2, 127 [323] f.; *ACO*, 3, 4.24-5.11; Mansi, *op. cit.* (note 9 *supra*), 7, 110-12. Apart from minor variants in punctuation, I reproduce the text of *ACO*, 2, 1, 2, 79.16, except for ἡ κτιστὸν in the last sentence, which occurs in Athanasius' recension and seems to be an essential element of the Creed: *De decretis Nicaenae Synodi*, 37, 2, ed. Hans-Georg Opitz, *Athanasius Werke*, 2, 1 (Berlin-Leipzig, 1935), 36.33-37.2. For the formation and meaning of the Creed, see J. N. D. Kelly, *Early Christian Creeds* (London, 1951), 215 ff., and the literature set forth in *Dumbarton Oaks Papers*, 6 (1951), 141 note 60.

πιστεύομεν εἰς ἕνα θεὸν πατέρα παντοκράτορα, πάντων ὁρατῶν τε καὶ ἀοράτων ποιητὴν. καὶ εἰς ἕνα κύριον Ἰησοῦν Χριστόν, τὸν υἱὸν τοῦ θεοῦ, γεννηθέντα ἐκ τοῦ πατρὸς μονογενῆ, τουτέστιν ἐκ τῆς οὐσίας τοῦ πατρὸς, θεὸν ἐκ θεοῦ, φῶς ἐκ φωτός, θεὸν ἀληθινὸν ἐκ θεοῦ ἀληθινοῦ, γεννηθέντα οὐ ποιηθέντα, ὁμοούσιον τῷ πατρί· δι' οὗ τὰ πάντα ἐγένετο, τὰ τε ἐν τῷ οὐρανῷ καὶ τὰ ἐν τῇ γῇ, τὸν δι' ἡμᾶς τοὺς ἀνθρώπους καὶ διὰ τὴν ἡμετέραν σωτηρίαν κατελθόντα καὶ σαρκωθέντα καὶ ἐνανθρωπήσαντα, παθόντα καὶ ἀναστάντα τῇ τρίτῃ ἡμέρᾳ, ἀνελθόντα εἰς τοὺς οὐρανοὺς, καὶ ἐρχόμενον κρῖναι ζῶντας καὶ νεκρούς. καὶ εἰς τὸ ἅγιον πνεῦμα. τοὺς δὲ λέγοντας, ἦν ποτε ὅτε οὐκ ἦν, καὶ πρὶν γεννηθῆναι οὐκ ἦν, καὶ ὅτι ἐξ οὐκ ὄντων ἐγένετο, ἢ ἐξ ἑτέρας ὑποστάσεως ἢ οὐσίας φάσκοντας εἶναι, ἢ κτιστὸν ἢ τρεπτὸν ἢ ἀλλοιωτὸν τὸν υἱὸν τοῦ θεοῦ [τούτους] ἀναθεματίζει ἡ καθολικὴ καὶ ἀποστολικὴ ἐκκλησία.

The so-called Creed of 381, which first appears as such in the Acts of the Council of Chalcedon is taken from *ACO*, 2, 1, 2, 80 [276]:

Πιστεύομεν εἰς ἕνα θεὸν πατέρα παντοκράτορα, ποιητὴν οὐρανοῦ καὶ γῆς, ὁρατῶν τε πάντων καὶ ἀοράτων. καὶ εἰς ἕνα κύριον Ἰησοῦν Χριστόν, τὸν υἱὸν τοῦ θεοῦ τὸν μονογενῆ, τὸν ἐκ τοῦ πατρὸς γεννηθέντα πρὸ πάντων τῶν αἰώνων, φῶς ἐκ φωτός, θεὸν ἀληθινὸν ἐκ θεοῦ ἀληθινοῦ, γεννηθέντα οὐ ποιηθέντα, ὁμοούσιον τῷ πατρί, δι' οὗ τὰ πάντα ἐγένετο, τὸν δι' ἡμᾶς τοὺς ἀνθρώπους καὶ διὰ τὴν ἡμετέραν σωτηρίαν κατελθόντα ἐκ τῶν οὐρανῶν καὶ σαρκωθέντα ἐκ πνεύματος ἁγίου καὶ Μαρίας τῆς παρθένου καὶ ἐνανθρωπήσαντα, σταυρωθέντα τε ὑπὲρ ἡμῶν ἐπὶ Ποντίου Πιλάτου, καὶ παθόντα καὶ ταφέντα, καὶ ἀναστάντα τῇ τρίτῃ ἡμέρᾳ κατὰ τὰς γραφάς, καὶ ἀνελθόντα εἰς τοὺς οὐρανοὺς, καὶ καθελόμενον ἐν δεξιᾷ τοῦ πατρὸς, καὶ πάλιν ἐρχόμενον μετὰ δόξης κρῖναι ζῶντας καὶ νεκρούς· οὗ τῆς βασιλείας οὐκ ἔσται τέλος. καὶ εἰς τὸ πνεῦμα τὸ ἅγιον, τὸ κύριον καὶ ζωοποιόν, τὸ ἐκ τοῦ πατρὸς ἐκπορευόμενον, τὸ σὺν πατρί καὶ υἱῷ συμπροσκυνούμενον καὶ συνδοξαζόμενον, τὸ λαλῆσαν διὰ τῶν προφητῶν· εἰς μίαν ἁγίαν καθολικὴν καὶ ἀποστολικὴν ἐκκλησίαν. ὁμολογοῦμεν ἕνα βάπτισμα εἰς ἄφεσιν ἁμαρτιῶν· προσδοκῶμεν ἀνάστασιν νεκρῶν καὶ ζωὴν τοῦ μέλλοντος αἰῶνος.

⁷¹ *Bazaar*, frag. 308, p. 388 f., cf. *ibid.*, ix f., xxix f., 241, 369 ff., 374 f., 378. For the text of the Tome of Leo (Ep. 28), see *ACO*, 2, 2, 1, 24-33 (Latin); 2, 1, 1, 10-20 (Greek version); C. Silva-Tarouca, *S. Leonis Magni Tomus ad Flavianum Episc. Constantinopolitanum (Textus et documenta, Series theologica*, 9 [Rome, 1932]). For exegesis, etc.: Hugo Rahner, "Leo der Grosse, der Papst des Konzils," *Das Konzil von Chalkedon*, 1 (see note 1), 323-39; Paul Galtier, "Saint Cyrille d'Alexandrie et Saint Léon le

Still, since Cyril is universally esteemed in the Church as a Chalcedonian before Chalcedon, the Christology of Nestorius, if orthodox, should be reconcilable, notwithstanding angry denials on both sides, with Cyril's. In truth, it must be admitted, the line which separates them on this, as on all other issues, is either very thin or nonexistent. Both agreed that the qualities of the two natures were referable to the one person, Jesus Christ. They defined this entity somewhat differently, but it is obvious that Cyril's "one prosopon, . . . the one incarnate hypostasis of God the Logos,"⁷² and Nestorius' "one prosopon of Jesus Christ" (notes 37, 42f.) were both intended to define the Jesus Christ of the Gospels. Moreover, Cyril's characteristic notion that "the Logos suffered in the flesh" is theologically the exact equivalent of Nestorius' dogma that the Logos suffered in the prosopon of the manhood which he took for his own. For, as we have seen (note 38ff.), the prosopon of the manhood is the *schema* or the flesh and body of Jesus Christ.

Nevertheless, Nestorius was always offended by Cyril's constant preoccupation with the paradox that God the Logos suffered, died, and was raised from the dead—in the flesh—although he recognized (notes 57–62) the validity of the proposition stated in this form. His unwillingness to do so without the necessary restrictions, however, and his insistence that the human experiences should in a strict sense be attributed to Jesus Christ, or to his human nature (or, as he preferred to put it, to the human prosopon [*sense A*] which the Logos appropriated for himself), rather than to the divine nature of the Logos, are by no means to be regarded as idiosyncrasies of "Nestorianism." On the contrary, Cyril himself made similar qualifications, as in his letter to John of Antioch, in which he quotes with approval the compromise Creed of 433. A passage in this document, whose orthodoxy received oecumenical confirmation at the Council of Chalcedon in 451, corresponds exactly with what Nestorius had to say on the same topic (see quotations in notes 60 and 63 *supra*): "With regard to the evangelical and apostolic texts concerning the Lord, we know that the theologians make some common as referring to one person, and distinguish others, as referring to two natures, assigning those appropriate to God to the divinity of Christ, and the humble ones to his humanity."^{72a}

At the same time, granting Nestorius to have been technically correct on all these matters, we can be sure that the Chalcedonians would have been bewildered by his strange view⁷³ that God only "passed through the holy virgin, the

Grand à Chalcédoine," *ibid.*, 1, 345–87; Trevor Jalland, *The Life and Times of St. Leo the Great* (London, 1941), 451ff., the best general book on Leo. Cf. Altaner, *Patrologie*, § 78,11 for further bibliography.

⁷² *ACO*, 1, 1, 1, 38.21ff.; Bindley, *op. cit.*, (note 9 *supra*), 112.205–7; P.G., 77, 116 C: ἐν τοιγαροῦν προσώπῳ τὰς ἐν τοῖς εὐαγγελίοις πάσας ἀναθεῖον φωνάς, ὑποστάσει μιᾷ τῇ τοῦ Λόγου σεσαρκωμένη. Κύριος γὰρ εἰς Ἰησοῦς Χριστός, κατὰ τὰς γραφάς. Cf. du Manoir de Juaye, *loc. cit.* (note 66 *supra*).

^{72a} *ACO*, 1, 1, 4, 17. 17–20; P.G., 77, 177 AB; Bindley, *op. cit.* (note 9 *supra*), 142.61ff.: τὰς δὲ εὐαγγελικὰς καὶ ἀποστολικὰς περὶ τοῦ Κυρίου φωνάς, ἴσμεν τοὺς θεολόγους ἄνδρας, τὰς μὲν κοινοποιούντας, ὡς ἐφ' ἑνὸς προσώπου, τὰς δὲ διαιροῦντας, ὡς ἐπὶ δύο φύσεων· καὶ τὰς μὲν θεοπρεπεῖς κατὰ τὴν θεότητα τοῦ Χριστοῦ, τὰς δὲ ταπεινάς κατὰ τὴν ἀνθρωπότητα παραδίδόντας.

Approval by Chalcedon: *ACO*, 2, 1, 2, 81 [277]. 1–13. When the Illyrian and Palestinian bishops expressed doubts as to the orthodoxy of expressions of this sort, other passages were quoted from Cyril's writings to the same effect: *ibid.*, 82 [278]. 4–36; Mansi, 6, 972D. See Galtier, *loc. cit.* (note 50 *supra*), 355f.; Sellers, *op. cit.* (note 1 *supra*), 90–95; Nestorius, *Bazaar*, 314ff.

⁷³ *Bazaar*, 296. Gregory of Nazianzus had opposed this view: P.G., 37, 177Cf.

'mother of Christ','' but was not born of her. They agreed with him that God did not derive the origin of his being from Mary, but they expressed this idea differently (see the Creed of 451 in note 9 *supra*). In strict justice, Nestorius can be vindicated on this point also, and he definitely avoided the Gnostic and Manichaean implications of this peculiar description of the relation of the Godhead to Mary. For the Gnostic doctrine that "Jesus passed through Mary like water through a pipe"⁷⁴ was directed against Christ's assumption of a truly human nature, which Nestorius always championed.

It is not correct, however, to say, as many do, that he was primarily concerned with the human nature of Jesus. He does, of course, lay great stress upon Christ's manhood. But he by no means neglects the divine nature. Indeed, his theory that neither of the two *usiai* could be mixed with the other or combined with it in its own *usia* was intended, among other things, to preserve the impassibility of the divine nature (see notes 59-64 *supra*). Actually, Nestorius' Christology is not characterized by preoccupation with either one of the two natures to the exclusion or detriment of the other, but rather by uncompromising insistence upon the union of both of them in Christ, in their full totality, and unimpaired.

He was the dyophysite *par excellence*, and, more than any other theologian, except possibly Theodoret of Cyrus (d. 466),⁷⁵ his friend and ally, devoted his energies to demonstrating that Jesus Christ was equally and in full measure both God and man, both human and divine. No one else championed this principle more vigorously than he, or was more forceful in denouncing the slightest deviation from it.

In view of the great merit of his theological ideas, it is all the more regrettable that he was not able to present them more skilfully. The obscurity and prolixity of his style are major defects, from which he cannot be exculpated, and explain in part why he failed to hold the favor of Emperor Theodosius II (408-50), and spent the last years of his life (from 431-*ca.* 451)⁷⁶ in agonizing exile.

⁷⁴ Irenaeus, *Against Heresies*, 3, 11, 8, ed. W. W. Harvey, *Sancti Irenaei episcopi lugdunensis libros quinque adversus haereses*, 2 (Cambridge, 1857), 42.

⁷⁵ On Theodoret, see Quasten, *Patrology*, 3, 536-54; Altaner, *Patrologie*, § 73.

⁷⁶ For the chronology, see, in addition to the works cited in note 1 *supra*, B. J. Kidd, *A History of the Church to A.D. 461*, 3 (Oxford, 1922), 267 f.; J. F. Bethune-Baker, "The Date of the Death of Nestorius," *Journal of Theological Studies*, 9 (1907-8), 601-5: Nestorius was alive at the time of the Council of Chalcedon.

Note: Special tribute should be paid to G. R. Driver, Leonard Hodgson, and François Nau (see note 1 *supra*) for their meticulous translations of the *Bazaar*, without which this essay would never have been undertaken. In my quotations therefrom, I have used square brackets to indicate words added by the translators or my own exegesis of the text.